Le moi, idole d'une volonté désarmée. Pascal, critique de la liberté cartésienne

This dissertation deals with the discussion between two Early Modern French philosophers, namely Descartes and Pascal. Quite often, both thinkers are opposed to each other on the basis of their different views on reason. Whereas Descartes, throughout his philosophy, represents an optimistic belief in the human thinking capacity, Pascal ruthlessly attacks any philosopher who believes in an innate pursuit of truth and happiness. In his Pensées we find explicit references where he humiliates reason and where he mocks philosophy. In many secondary studies, Pascal is therefore presented as the pessimistic theologian or antiphilosopher who turns against Descartes' rationalism. Some commentators (Carraud and Marion) claim for instance that Pascal invented the notion of 'le moi' (or 'the self') as a sort of pastiche on the Cartesian 'cogito'. In their opinion, the pascalian self ('le moi') is a kind of decentralization or a desubstantialization of the Cartesian cogito, as it appears in the second meditation. The purpose of this dissertation is to approach Pascal's concept of the self ("le moi") from a different angle. We argue that Pascals notion of the (imaginary) self provides a threefold critique of the Cartesian approach to free will. Pascal's notion of the self betrays the presence of a depraved will that, in collaboration with the imagination, turns away from truth and happiness. Besides, the will is also the source of a deceptive relation to oneself. Through this approach, Pascal radically rejects Descartes' conception of a free will which, by its very nature, focuses on truth and happiness and is at the same time the source of an authentic self-esteem ('générosité'). Descartes defines our will as an absolute free capacity that can never be restrained. The proper use of our freedom is first and foremost decisive for our true judgments in the field of knowledge: it frees us from error and let us assent to clear and distinct ideas. In addition, the will, as the image and likeness of God in us, is the condition for our highest good. If we arm the will with strong and resolute judgments, we can overcome excessive passions and ultimately achieve self-satisfaction or "contentement de soi". Finally, the proper use of our free will leads to the highest form of self-esteem or 'générosité'. But the knowledge and feeling of our freedom does not only lead to an authentic self-relationship: it is also the source of a magnanimous love to the other. According to Descartes, only a generous man is able to appreciate and love the other in an authentic way. Indeed, for him, our free will is what makes us image and likeness to God, a perfection that we recognize in ourselves but also in every human being. Pascal will radically disprove this link between free will and authentic self-esteem. In his Pensées, the self is indeed the expression of the lie, of an illusory and restless pursuit of happiness ('divertissement') and of a deceptive relationship with oneself. In particular, the self betrays the influence of a corrupted will which, in close collaboration with the imagination, turns away from truth and happiness. Whereas Descartes starts from an absolutely free will, Pascal's will is radically corrupted and shackled by excessive passions and desires. This pessimism can be explained from Pascal's theological background: indebted to Augustine's theory of original sin, Pascal (like many of his Jansenist contemporaries) stated that, since the Fall, all human faculties are corrupted: reason was weak, imagination became a dominant power and will was radically depraved. However, the aim of this dissertation consists in showing that Pascal's approach of the will overcomes its theological background. More specifically, we tend to read his approach of the will and the self as a radical attack on Descartes' notion of freedom. Rather than placing Pascal's theological interpretation of will against Descartes' approach to freedom, we are looking at how Pascal undermines every fundamental aspect of Descartes' optimism about free will. For example, we show how Pascal Descartes' notion of free will literally and figuratively 'disarms' ('désarmer'). Whereas Descartes speaks of a will that is armed against passions by means of strong and certain judgments (which he literally 'les armes propres de la volonté'), in Pascal's thinking the will appears as being chained to all sorts of disordered passions and desires. As a result, the will no longer assents to the clear an distinct ideas of the mind, but to representations coming from an other capacity that is given a prominent place in Pascal's thinking, namely the imagination. This capacity, also known as the mistress of errors and mistakes and as a manipulator par excellence, responds to the desires of depraved will. As far as the domain of knowledge is concerned, imagination is responsible for false judgments or lies: the will agrees with its pleasant representations and is therefore easily turns away from truth. In addition, the imagination also plays an important role in the field of morality: the will, characterized by restlessness and by a disordered desire for happiness and grandeur, collaborates with the imagination to create the illusion of a temporary happiness. Thus, in his various activities or 'divertissements', every human being will constantly rush to imaginary objects which he himself believes will make him happy. And finally, imagination is the breeding ground for an illusory self-image (le moi imaginaire). The will, driven by excessive self-love, creates with 'le moi' an imaginary self, an idol ('idole') that responds to the desire of appearing perfect and happy in the eyes of the other.status: publishe