The epistemic value of democracy, between facts and norms

© 2016 Revue Philosophique de Louvain. This article starts by examining three epistemic justifications for democracy proposed by José Luis Martí, David Estlund, and Hélène Landemore. All three seek to show in what way democracy (or certain forms of it) have a tendancy to bring about correct decisions, but run the risk of legitimising a technocratic organisation of the political, in contradiction with the principle of political equality. They are therefore of the view that the epistemic argument cannot suffice to justify democratic institutions. However, if one understands the "epistemic" value of a political decision at the same time from a factual and a normative point of view, i.e. if one considers at the same time its rationality and impartiality, a much more robust epistemic justification of democracy emerges. It is the latter that is explored and defended in the second part of this article (transl. J. Dudley).status: publishe