Institutional Choice and the Political Economy of Federalism & European Integration

This dissertation presents five chapters about institutional choice in the area of federalism and European integration. The methods used and the perspective adopted roughly correspond to what is known as “political economy”: the study of politics with methodology from economics (game theory and econometrics), and the study of how economics and politics interact. Substantively, the focus is on the impact of formal political rules in federations on outcomes such as the division of power and the durability of the federation, and on the choice over such rules, i.e. institutional choice. Content Chapter 1. Playing with the Rules: Institutions and Institutional Choice Chapter 2. Choosing an Informative Agenda Setter: the Appointment of the European Commission Chapter 3. Making Exit Costly but Efficient: The Political Economy of Exit Clauses and Secession Chapter 4. Heterogeneity, Vetoes and Exit Clauses in Federal Systems Chapter 5. Subsidiarity in the European Union: When Do National Parliaments Send Reasoned Opinions?1. Playing with the Rules: Institutions and Institutional Choice 2. Choosing an Informative Agenda Setter: the Appointment of the European Commission 3. Making Exit Costly but Efficient: The Political Economy of Exit Clauses and Secession 4. Heterogeneity, Vetoes and Exit Clauses in Federal Systems 5. Subsidiarity in the EU: When Do National Parliaments Send Reasoned Opinions?nrpages: 168status: publishe