A Global Crisis at a Local Level? Economic Voting in Belgian Local Elections

It is generally accepted that at national level economic factors such as unemployment affect the popularity of incumbent democratic governments. But does this premise also play at a municipal level where linkages between citizens and politics are more personal? Do voters in municipal elections punish (or reward) the standing majority according to perceptions of the economic condition in that municipality? This paper will investigate these questions using data from an exit poll of Belgian municipal elections (2012). More specifically we will first assess if the economic condition of a municipality affects inhabitants’ satisfaction with local government. Second we will investigate if the reward-and-punishment mechanism for the economy is directed towards voting for incumbents at a local level. Furthermore, the Belgian political context, with basically two electoral systems within one country allows us to investigate the question whether the presence of regionalist parties mitigates the effect of the economic vote, as suggested in the literature. Analyses show that economic indicators, like unemployment affect citizens’ satisfaction with local government. Moreover local governments are held accountable by the voters in the polling booth while local satisfaction proves to be an important indicator for incumbent voting. Contrary to what we expected, the results also show that the reward-and-punishment mechanism is actually strongest in the Flemish electoral context.status: publishe