Algebraic Techniques in Differential Cryptanalysis Revisited

At FSE 2009, Albrecht et al. proposed a new cryptanalytic method that combines algebraic and differential cryptanalysis. They introduced three new attacks, namely Attack A, Attack B and Attack C. For Attack A, they explain that the time complexity is difficult to determine. The goal of Attacks B and C is to filter out wrong pairs and then recover the key. In this paper, we show that Attack C does not provide an advantage over differential cryptanalysis for typical block ciphers, because it cannot be used to filter out any wrong pairs that satisfy the ciphertext differences. Furthermore, we explain why Attack B provides no advantage over differential cryptanalysis for PRESENT. We verify our results for PRESENT experimentally, using both PolyBoRi and MiniSat. Our work helps to understand which equations are important in the differential-algebraic attack. Based on our findings, we present two new differential-algebraic attacks. Using the first method, our attack on 15-round PRESENT-80 requires 2 59 chosen plaintexts and has a worst-case time complexity of 2 73.79 equivalent encryptions. Our new attack on 14-round PRESENT-128 requires 2 55 chosen plaintexts and has a worst-case time complexity of 2 112.83 equivalent encryptions. Although these attacks have a higher time complexity than the differential attacks, their data complexity is lower. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.status: publishe