In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental policy instruments in a general equilibrium framework. Goulder et al. (J.Pub.Econ., 1999) look into the choice of policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes. We extend this model by no longer assuming full compliance from firms. A violating firm is caught with a certain probability by the inspection agency. Once a violator is detected, he always has to pay a fine. With a positive, finite expected fine and a probability of detection smaller than unity, there will always be a certain proportion of noncompliance in the economy. We calculate the gross efficiency costs of different policy instruments (emission tax, output tax, tradable p...
This paper originated from the AEE/REE presidential address for the XXX Simposio de Análisis Económi...
Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the ...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental polic...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental polic...
We study how the relative cost efficiency of three market-based instruments—emission taxes, tradable...
This paper examines to what extent incomplete compliance of environmental regulation mitigates the d...
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental p...
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental p...
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achie...
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achie...
The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly mon...
The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly mon...
This chapter examines government policy alternatives for protecting the environment. We compare envi...
Environmental policy instruments, Monitoring and enforcement, General equilibrium model, D5, H23, K4...
This paper originated from the AEE/REE presidential address for the XXX Simposio de Análisis Económi...
Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the ...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental polic...
In this paper we incorporate monitoring and enforcement aspects in the choice of environmental polic...
We study how the relative cost efficiency of three market-based instruments—emission taxes, tradable...
This paper examines to what extent incomplete compliance of environmental regulation mitigates the d...
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental p...
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental p...
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achie...
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achie...
The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly mon...
The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly mon...
This chapter examines government policy alternatives for protecting the environment. We compare envi...
Environmental policy instruments, Monitoring and enforcement, General equilibrium model, D5, H23, K4...
This paper originated from the AEE/REE presidential address for the XXX Simposio de Análisis Económi...
Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the ...
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of op...