Add to ORKGWe rationalize the puzzling existence of binding quotas that are not fully utilized. Our model has its roots in Bhagwati (1965) on tariffs/quotas equivalence and is related to the I0 literature on pre-emption. We study the conditions that lead a monopolist, facing a quota-restricted market, to buy the quota licenses itself and the condi-tions under which they may remain unused. The divisibility of the quota is crucial for the monopolist to pre-emptively buy the quota. Further-more, we study the implications of "use-it-or-lose-it" clauses commonly imposed on auctioned quotas.N/
The paper develops a two-stage capacity constrained model, in which the mode of competition is endog...
We present a dynamic model of Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal con...
Krishna [89] shows that quotas may act as facilitating devices by relaxing price competition. We ext...
This article looks at the implications for trade policy of recent work on quota auctions. Recent wor...
In the literature on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) as a \u85shery management tool, relativel...
In this paper the differenee between firm-specific and market quotas as two kinds of quantity restri...
Production quotas can restore efficiency in industries characterized by production externalities, su...
It is shown that the standard arguments for a monopoly to persist break down when many units of capa...
Market access in the WTO is highly fragmented due to exceptions from GATT principles. Tariff-rate qu...
A strategy to convert quotas to tariffs is to auction the quota rights and use the realized auction ...
Krishna [89] shows that quotas may act as facilitating devices by relaxing price competition. We ext...
In this paper we look at the effect of the removal of firm-specific binding and non-binding quotas i...
A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand import quotas where licenses are allocated o...
This paper analyses the conversion of TRQs into single tariffs under perfect and imperfect competiti...
A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand import quotas where licenses are allocated o...
The paper develops a two-stage capacity constrained model, in which the mode of competition is endog...
We present a dynamic model of Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal con...
Krishna [89] shows that quotas may act as facilitating devices by relaxing price competition. We ext...
This article looks at the implications for trade policy of recent work on quota auctions. Recent wor...
In the literature on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) as a \u85shery management tool, relativel...
In this paper the differenee between firm-specific and market quotas as two kinds of quantity restri...
Production quotas can restore efficiency in industries characterized by production externalities, su...
It is shown that the standard arguments for a monopoly to persist break down when many units of capa...
Market access in the WTO is highly fragmented due to exceptions from GATT principles. Tariff-rate qu...
A strategy to convert quotas to tariffs is to auction the quota rights and use the realized auction ...
Krishna [89] shows that quotas may act as facilitating devices by relaxing price competition. We ext...
In this paper we look at the effect of the removal of firm-specific binding and non-binding quotas i...
A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand import quotas where licenses are allocated o...
This paper analyses the conversion of TRQs into single tariffs under perfect and imperfect competiti...
A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses-on-demand import quotas where licenses are allocated o...
The paper develops a two-stage capacity constrained model, in which the mode of competition is endog...
We present a dynamic model of Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal con...
Krishna [89] shows that quotas may act as facilitating devices by relaxing price competition. We ext...