This paper analyses banks' choice between lending to firms in exclusive relationships and sharing financing with other banks in a context where both firms and banks are subject to moral hazard problems, and bank monitoring is essential for financing to take place. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher per-project monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding problem and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to the size of investment projects, when firms are less profitable, and when poor financial integration, strict regulation and inefficient judicial systems make monitoring more costly. These results are ...
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms t...
Over the years, the lending procedures of microcredit has evolved. The original joint liability grou...
Abstract: When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default r...
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with oth...
This paper analyses banks' choice between lending to firms in exclusive relationships and sharing fi...
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with oth...
This paper investigates, in a simple model of overlapping moral hazard problems between banks and fi...
A theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank-f...
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixtu...
The widespread evidence of multiple bank lending relationships in credit markets suggests that firms ...
Information Disclosure This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms th...
Why firms apply for credit at several banks? The model presented here provides an answer, based on t...
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixtu...
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive fin...
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive fi...
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms t...
Over the years, the lending procedures of microcredit has evolved. The original joint liability grou...
Abstract: When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default r...
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with oth...
This paper analyses banks' choice between lending to firms in exclusive relationships and sharing fi...
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with oth...
This paper investigates, in a simple model of overlapping moral hazard problems between banks and fi...
A theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank-f...
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixtu...
The widespread evidence of multiple bank lending relationships in credit markets suggests that firms ...
Information Disclosure This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms th...
Why firms apply for credit at several banks? The model presented here provides an answer, based on t...
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixtu...
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive fin...
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive fi...
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms t...
Over the years, the lending procedures of microcredit has evolved. The original joint liability grou...
Abstract: When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default r...