This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to measure the parameters of inequity aversion in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function. We find that our participants show aversion against advantageous as well as disadvantageous inequity to a considerable amount. Moreover, the degree of inequity aversion is higher compared to that of students in the similar study of Dannenberg et al. (2007). Regarding the geographical variety in our sample, we cannot confirm significant differenc...
The design of environmental policy raises several equity issues, in particular the distribution of b...
In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual per...
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the ...
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this ...
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this ...
This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outco...
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, th...
An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational ...
The process of negotiating climate change, as any bargaining process according to realism as well as...
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explaine...
One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries’ disagreement on how to share ...
This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of participating i...
This chapter examines the impact of inequality-averse attitudes on the individual incentives of part...
The design of environmental policy raises several equity issues, in particular the distribution of b...
In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual per...
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the ...
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this ...
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this ...
This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outco...
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, th...
An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational ...
The process of negotiating climate change, as any bargaining process according to realism as well as...
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explaine...
One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries’ disagreement on how to share ...
This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of participating i...
This chapter examines the impact of inequality-averse attitudes on the individual incentives of part...
The design of environmental policy raises several equity issues, in particular the distribution of b...
In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual per...
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the ...