Add to ORKGUsing a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.publishedVersio
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future particip...
Abstract: The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emissi...
We model climate negotiations as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, players have to a...
Abstract: Linkage of different countries’ domestic permit markets for pollution rights into a singl...
This paper studies, in a numerical environment, climate treaties with emissions trading when nationa...
Abstract: Motivated by the climate problem, this paper examines some effects of international cap & ...
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers in PDF are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb...
We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided...
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers in PDF are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb...
Abstract. We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emiss...
This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates ov...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
We theoretically and numerically analyse the impacts for a small, open country with carbon abatement...
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future particip...
International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 e...
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future particip...
Abstract: The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emissi...
We model climate negotiations as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, players have to a...
Abstract: Linkage of different countries’ domestic permit markets for pollution rights into a singl...
This paper studies, in a numerical environment, climate treaties with emissions trading when nationa...
Abstract: Motivated by the climate problem, this paper examines some effects of international cap & ...
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers in PDF are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb...
We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided...
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers in PDF are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb...
Abstract. We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emiss...
This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates ov...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
We theoretically and numerically analyse the impacts for a small, open country with carbon abatement...
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future particip...
International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 e...
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future particip...
Abstract: The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emissi...
We model climate negotiations as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, players have to a...