Add to ORKGIn a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and a one-step bonus scheme. The choice of ownership is shown to depend critically on the punishment strategies and the nature of the uncertainty
Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm...
This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liabi...
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or inv...
In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relat...
In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I sugg...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A ...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
A framework is developed for a theory of the firm that combines asset ownership and implicit contrac...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A ...
This paper characterises the optimal contract for a principal who repeatedly chooses among a set of ...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in their companies. A n...
We propose a simple and general framework for comparing di¤erent ownership struc-tures with respect ...
This paper examines how relational contracting affects the pattern of trade across the econ-omy. We ...
This paper reexamines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship...
I suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership ...
Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm...
This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liabi...
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or inv...
In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relat...
In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I sugg...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A ...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
A framework is developed for a theory of the firm that combines asset ownership and implicit contrac...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into physical assets. A ...
This paper characterises the optimal contract for a principal who repeatedly chooses among a set of ...
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in their companies. A n...
We propose a simple and general framework for comparing di¤erent ownership struc-tures with respect ...
This paper examines how relational contracting affects the pattern of trade across the econ-omy. We ...
This paper reexamines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship...
I suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership ...
Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm...
This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liabi...
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or inv...