Add to ORKGA model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is iso-elastic. Some or all firms may hold excess capacity in the perfect equilibrium to the entry game. Firms with a first mover advantage trade off the positioning value of a large investment in capacity, leading to a large market share, against the possible costs of bearing the burden of entry deterrence through holding excess capacity in equilibrium.
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choos...
A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is isoelastic. Some or al...
We analyse sequential entry in a quantity-setting oligopoly model. Firms have the option to adopt ei...
We analyse sequential entry in a quantity-setting oligopoly model. Firms have the option to adopt ei...
With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assum...
In this paper we develop an analytic model to provide insight into strategic capac-ity planning in c...
This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then firm...
This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then firm...
This thesis examines the issues of incumbency, entry and trade restrictions in a capacity constraine...
This paper considers the Dixit model of entry deterrence and adapts it to the case in which firms ar...
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity,...
This paper introduces a continuous-time game to study two ex ante identical firms ’ incentives in ca...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choos...
A model of sequential entry with Leontief costs is studied in which demand is isoelastic. Some or al...
We analyse sequential entry in a quantity-setting oligopoly model. Firms have the option to adopt ei...
We analyse sequential entry in a quantity-setting oligopoly model. Firms have the option to adopt ei...
With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assum...
In this paper we develop an analytic model to provide insight into strategic capac-ity planning in c...
This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then firm...
This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then firm...
This thesis examines the issues of incumbency, entry and trade restrictions in a capacity constraine...
This paper considers the Dixit model of entry deterrence and adapts it to the case in which firms ar...
This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity,...
This paper introduces a continuous-time game to study two ex ante identical firms ’ incentives in ca...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose...
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choos...