In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades situations where socially valuable information is wasted can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a su�ciently unpredictable way.
We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs ...
Socia learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which ...
Social learning is essential to survival. It is likely to evolve when it is more efficient than asoc...
In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
The social learning literature shows that when agents learn from the actions of others (in addition ...
An “information cascade” occurs when initial decisions coincide in a way that it is optimal for each...
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors e...
We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a rela...
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors e...
In an observational learning environment rational agents maymimic the actions of the predecessors ev...
In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a fe...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The...
We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs ...
Socia learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which ...
Social learning is essential to survival. It is likely to evolve when it is more efficient than asoc...
In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
The social learning literature shows that when agents learn from the actions of others (in addition ...
An “information cascade” occurs when initial decisions coincide in a way that it is optimal for each...
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors e...
We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a rela...
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors e...
In an observational learning environment rational agents maymimic the actions of the predecessors ev...
In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a fe...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The...
We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs ...
Socia learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which ...
Social learning is essential to survival. It is likely to evolve when it is more efficient than asoc...