Add to ORKGThis work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results [Lehrer, Neyman and Okada] on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
Abstract This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus a...
Abstract. In this note we consider a general infinitely repeated game with 푁 players based on a dete...
We examine two-person zero-sum repeated games in which the players' action choices are restricted in...
This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the playe...
This work studies two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restric...
The paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies ov...
Two agents independently choose mixed m-recall strategies that take actions in finite action spaces ...
We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number M such that all sub-game perfect out...
This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t...
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded memory (reca...
This paper provides a characterization for the set of outcomes which can be sustained by subgame per...
Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defect...
International audienceWe study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost ...
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he ...
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he ...
Abstract This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus a...
Abstract. In this note we consider a general infinitely repeated game with 푁 players based on a dete...
We examine two-person zero-sum repeated games in which the players' action choices are restricted in...
This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the playe...
This work studies two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restric...
The paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies ov...
Two agents independently choose mixed m-recall strategies that take actions in finite action spaces ...
We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number M such that all sub-game perfect out...
This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t...
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded memory (reca...
This paper provides a characterization for the set of outcomes which can be sustained by subgame per...
Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defect...
International audienceWe study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost ...
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he ...
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he ...
Abstract This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus a...
Abstract. In this note we consider a general infinitely repeated game with 푁 players based on a dete...
We examine two-person zero-sum repeated games in which the players' action choices are restricted in...