Add to ORKGThe present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.Vote splitting, uncertainty, insurance
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distri...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertai...
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognitio...
This article presents a game-theoretic model of voting and political bargaining where voters have tw...
This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-p...
Split-ticket voting is an important topic for analysis because over the last generation it has led, ...
Scholars argue that electoral uncertainty is a crucial factor that influences policy implementation:...
How do political parties work on the inside? Which factors determine their policies? What is the pla...
behavior, comparative politics, political psychology as well as political methodology. Comments are ...
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognitio...
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congres...
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-t...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertai...
This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a beh...
This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a beh...
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distri...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertai...
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognitio...
This article presents a game-theoretic model of voting and political bargaining where voters have tw...
This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-p...
Split-ticket voting is an important topic for analysis because over the last generation it has led, ...
Scholars argue that electoral uncertainty is a crucial factor that influences policy implementation:...
How do political parties work on the inside? Which factors determine their policies? What is the pla...
behavior, comparative politics, political psychology as well as political methodology. Comments are ...
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognitio...
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congres...
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-t...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertai...
This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a beh...
This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a beh...
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distri...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertai...
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognitio...