Add to ORKGWe characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.Collective Choice Rules, Consistency, Pareto Rule
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...
This paper presents a modal logic for modelling individual and collective choices over a set of fea...
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...
We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are con...
We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict p...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous de...
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate stan-dard rationality assumptio...
We define generalized (preference) domains as subsets of the hypercube {-1,1} (D) , where each of th...
A critical feature of many collective choices is the presence of uncertainty at each time period tha...
We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over ...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
This paper presents a modal logic for modelling individual and collective choices over a set of feas...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...
This paper presents a modal logic for modelling individual and collective choices over a set of fea...
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...
We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are con...
We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict p...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous de...
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate stan-dard rationality assumptio...
We define generalized (preference) domains as subsets of the hypercube {-1,1} (D) , where each of th...
A critical feature of many collective choices is the presence of uncertainty at each time period tha...
We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over ...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
This paper presents a modal logic for modelling individual and collective choices over a set of feas...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...
This paper presents a modal logic for modelling individual and collective choices over a set of fea...
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some par...