I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).Game theory ; Altruism
<div><p>The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a...
In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of ...
Abstract I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altr...
Experimental implementations of the Ultimatum Game are some of the most well studied economic experi...
Although methodological individualism has served the scientific claims of mainstream economics, it i...
The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on...
<div><p>Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked c...
In the present study we developed a simulation where agents play repeatedly the ultimatum game with ...
This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. Th...
Non-cooperative game theory predicts that Allocators in Ultimatum games will take almost all the &ap...
We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players' payoffs are linear in their own monetary in...
First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.The ...
When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typi...
Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bol...
<div><p>The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a...
In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of ...
Abstract I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altr...
Experimental implementations of the Ultimatum Game are some of the most well studied economic experi...
Although methodological individualism has served the scientific claims of mainstream economics, it i...
The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on...
<div><p>Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked c...
In the present study we developed a simulation where agents play repeatedly the ultimatum game with ...
This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. Th...
Non-cooperative game theory predicts that Allocators in Ultimatum games will take almost all the &ap...
We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players' payoffs are linear in their own monetary in...
First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.The ...
When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typi...
Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bol...
<div><p>The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers...
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a...
In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of ...