We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an "oblivious equilibrium," in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. We prove that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain "lighttail" condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. We develop bounds that can be computed to assess the accuracy of the approximation for any given applied problem. Through computational experiments, we fi...
I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous po...
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for...
We propose an oligopoly game where quantity setting firms have incomplete information about the dema...
We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of im...
Oblivious equilibrium is a new solution concept for approximating Markov perfect equilibrium in dyna...
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to highly concentrated markets. We defi...
Abstract—This paper studies a solution concept for large stochastic games. A standard solution conce...
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It...
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the as-sumption that behavior is...
This paper develops an econometric model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic marke...
We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entr...
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assump-tion that behavior is...
Artículo de publicación ISIMotivated by recent developments in applied dynamic analysis, this paper ...
The Cournot competition is a game in which two firms vie to produce the optimal quantity of a good. ...
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It...
I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous po...
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for...
We propose an oligopoly game where quantity setting firms have incomplete information about the dema...
We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of im...
Oblivious equilibrium is a new solution concept for approximating Markov perfect equilibrium in dyna...
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to highly concentrated markets. We defi...
Abstract—This paper studies a solution concept for large stochastic games. A standard solution conce...
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It...
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the as-sumption that behavior is...
This paper develops an econometric model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic marke...
We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entr...
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assump-tion that behavior is...
Artículo de publicación ISIMotivated by recent developments in applied dynamic analysis, this paper ...
The Cournot competition is a game in which two firms vie to produce the optimal quantity of a good. ...
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It...
I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous po...
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for...
We propose an oligopoly game where quantity setting firms have incomplete information about the dema...