Add to ORKGWe study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected profits. The presence of noise may reduce the informational externality due to asymmetric information, which increases the firm's expected profits.Asymmetric information, learning, monopoly, noise, quality, rational expectations, signaling
Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unkno...
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the message chosen. Theo...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
In this paper, we propose a model where N strategic informed traders who are endowed with heterogene...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle’s (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the (costly) message cho...
The study makes three major contributions towards understanding the role of asymmetric information a...
"This paper considers a signaling game between two competing firms and consumers. The firms have com...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We in...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We in...
We use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of traders who lack informational advantages ...
We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers engage in learni...
Separating signaling equilibria of financial markets with anonymous insiders are investigated. Defin...
This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the de...
We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nash equilib-rium. The high-price firm has...
Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unkno...
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the message chosen. Theo...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
In this paper, we propose a model where N strategic informed traders who are endowed with heterogene...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle’s (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the (costly) message cho...
The study makes three major contributions towards understanding the role of asymmetric information a...
"This paper considers a signaling game between two competing firms and consumers. The firms have com...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We in...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We in...
We use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of traders who lack informational advantages ...
We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers engage in learni...
Separating signaling equilibria of financial markets with anonymous insiders are investigated. Defin...
This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the de...
We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nash equilib-rium. The high-price firm has...
Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unkno...
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the message chosen. Theo...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...