Add to ORKGThis paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show a non-monotonic relationship between institutional efficiency and the size of innovation.Corporate sector;Economic models;Labor mobility;Productivity;...
Purpose: The study examines the association between firm-level political risk and corporate innovati...
Incremental innovations appears to be much more frequent than radical innovations. Possible explanat...
This paper analyzes collective decision making when individual preferences evolve through learning. ...
This paper is motivated by the apparent gap in the recent “risk” literature between understanding in...
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framewor...
This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that politica...
Motivated by a theoretical model, we empirically examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or po...
Analysis of public institutions must be robust to the uncertainties facing agents within them, and t...
We examine technology adoption and growth in a political economy framework where two alternative mec...
Sequential investment opportunities or the presence of a rival typically hasten investment under ris...
Public officials are constantly facing decisions under risk, particularly in digitalization policies...
We examine the relationship between firms’ political connections and corporate innovation in a Europ...
Political activism positively affects firm innovation. Firms that support more politicians, politici...
I investigate the argument that, in a two–party system with different regulatory objectives, politic...
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine busine...
Purpose: The study examines the association between firm-level political risk and corporate innovati...
Incremental innovations appears to be much more frequent than radical innovations. Possible explanat...
This paper analyzes collective decision making when individual preferences evolve through learning. ...
This paper is motivated by the apparent gap in the recent “risk” literature between understanding in...
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framewor...
This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that politica...
Motivated by a theoretical model, we empirically examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or po...
Analysis of public institutions must be robust to the uncertainties facing agents within them, and t...
We examine technology adoption and growth in a political economy framework where two alternative mec...
Sequential investment opportunities or the presence of a rival typically hasten investment under ris...
Public officials are constantly facing decisions under risk, particularly in digitalization policies...
We examine the relationship between firms’ political connections and corporate innovation in a Europ...
Political activism positively affects firm innovation. Firms that support more politicians, politici...
I investigate the argument that, in a two–party system with different regulatory objectives, politic...
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine busine...
Purpose: The study examines the association between firm-level political risk and corporate innovati...
Incremental innovations appears to be much more frequent than radical innovations. Possible explanat...
This paper analyzes collective decision making when individual preferences evolve through learning. ...