Add to ORKGWe provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations for firm subsidised general training rely on wage compression across skill categories.competitive labor market; general training
Abstract: We develop a product market theory that explains why firms pro-vide their workers with ski...
We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. Wh...
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive....
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. I...
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. I...
In recent contributions, Acemoglu and Pischke argue that wage compression induces firms to invest in...
In recent contributions, Acemoglu and Pischke argue that wage compression induces firms to invest in...
This article analyzes firm and worker's incentives to invest in general and specific training when t...
A labor market is considered that is characterized by job competition over job ladders. Firms payin...
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their worke...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
I consider a duopsony model od a general skilled labour market. The source of power of the firms is ...
Worker heterogeneity can generate conditions under which firms will invest in the general training ...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
Abstract: We develop a product market theory that explains why firms pro-vide their workers with ski...
We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. Wh...
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive....
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. I...
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. I...
In recent contributions, Acemoglu and Pischke argue that wage compression induces firms to invest in...
In recent contributions, Acemoglu and Pischke argue that wage compression induces firms to invest in...
This article analyzes firm and worker's incentives to invest in general and specific training when t...
A labor market is considered that is characterized by job competition over job ladders. Firms payin...
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their worke...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
I consider a duopsony model od a general skilled labour market. The source of power of the firms is ...
Worker heterogeneity can generate conditions under which firms will invest in the general training ...
International audienceAccording to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, gen...
Abstract: We develop a product market theory that explains why firms pro-vide their workers with ski...
We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. Wh...
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive....