Add to ORKGThere is a widespread belief that in auctions with private values, the seller's revenue is increasing in the number of bidders. We show that there exists an auction setting with symmetric and affiliated private values in which the seller's expected revenue in a first price auction is decreasing in the number of bidders who participate in the auction.
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
2006 We give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for fi...
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries le...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
We consider a first--price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common kn...
The symmetric equilibrium of third-price auctions is characterized. It makes a number of contrasting...
We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does...
In Pinkse and Tan (2005) we show the existence of a new effect called the affilia-tion effect, which...
We study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the...
This short paper shows that in an aÆliated value setting more bidders at the auction stage need not ...
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient f...
This note considers the Symmetric Independent Private Values Model with public outside options that ...
We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent p...
This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auctio...
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
2006 We give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for fi...
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries le...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
We consider a first--price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common kn...
The symmetric equilibrium of third-price auctions is characterized. It makes a number of contrasting...
We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does...
In Pinkse and Tan (2005) we show the existence of a new effect called the affilia-tion effect, which...
We study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the...
This short paper shows that in an aÆliated value setting more bidders at the auction stage need not ...
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient f...
This note considers the Symmetric Independent Private Values Model with public outside options that ...
We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent p...
This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auctio...
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
2006 We give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for fi...
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries le...