Add to ORKGThis discussion paper led to a publication in 'Mathematical Social Sciences' 60(3), 210-16. Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.Spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comA spatial model of party competition is...
International audienceThis paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate ...
This paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of c...
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political par...
This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in...
This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in...
Election outcomes over the last decade in the Netherlands have been quite volatile. Identification o...
A well-known result in spatial voting theory is that, for a one-dimensional issue space and under ce...
We consider a spatial model of electoral competition between two politi-cal parties. These parties a...
We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and vot...
We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and vot...
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing poli...
This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public ...
We construct a locational model of majority voting when competing parties offer special favours to i...
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing poli...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comA spatial model of party competition is...
International audienceThis paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate ...
This paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of c...
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political par...
This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in...
This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in...
Election outcomes over the last decade in the Netherlands have been quite volatile. Identification o...
A well-known result in spatial voting theory is that, for a one-dimensional issue space and under ce...
We consider a spatial model of electoral competition between two politi-cal parties. These parties a...
We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and vot...
We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and vot...
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing poli...
This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public ...
We construct a locational model of majority voting when competing parties offer special favours to i...
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing poli...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comA spatial model of party competition is...
International audienceThis paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate ...
This paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of c...