We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose among two alternative instruments of external finance - corporate bonds and bank loans. We characterize the financing choice of firms and the endogenous financial structure of the economy. The calibrated model is used to address questions such as: What explains differences in the financial structure of the US and the euro area? What are the implications of these differences for allocations? We find that a higher share of bank finance in the euro area relative to the US is due to lower availability of public information about firms' credit worthiness and to higher efficiency of banks in acquiring this information. We also quantify the effect of...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
The composition of corporate borrowing between bank loans and market debt varies substantially, both...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage i...
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage i...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance, with asymmetric information ...
This paper proposes a model that links households and firms, as usual, by markets for factors and go...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
The composition of corporate borrowing between bank loans and market debt varies substantially, both...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose a...
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage i...
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage i...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity ...
This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance, with asymmetric information ...
This paper proposes a model that links households and firms, as usual, by markets for factors and go...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
We use a simple, graphical moral hazard model to compare monitored bank lending versus non-monitored...
The composition of corporate borrowing between bank loans and market debt varies substantially, both...