Add to ORKGIn this note we consider a basic property of common agency models: pure strategy equilibria of games where principals compete in direct mechanisms are robust to the possibility that principals might deviate and use more complex indirect mechanisms to design their contracts. We show that this property can be generalized to multi-principal multi-agent models.
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class ...
This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incent...
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility...
In this note we consider a basic property of common agency models: pure strategy equilibria of games...
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple co...
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and mul-tiple common agents. Ea...
In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for th...
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities betwe...
We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We r...
We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1...
I present a model in which the players of a game have the option to delegate parts of their strategi...
National audienceWe study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with mult...
International audienceThis note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common ag...
This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic ...
We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that de...
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class ...
This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incent...
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility...
In this note we consider a basic property of common agency models: pure strategy equilibria of games...
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple co...
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and mul-tiple common agents. Ea...
In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for th...
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities betwe...
We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We r...
We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1...
I present a model in which the players of a game have the option to delegate parts of their strategi...
National audienceWe study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with mult...
International audienceThis note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common ag...
This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic ...
We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that de...
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class ...
This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incent...
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility...