Add to ORKGThis paper analyzes how the forfeiture of illegal gains impacts the deterrence of illegal acts. We show that when public authorities introduce a claim on illegal gains as part of a sanction it may, counter-intuitively, increase crime in a setting in which criminals may invest in avoidance activities to lower the probability of detection.
Punishment for drug crimes includes not only penal sanctions, but economic sanctions in the form of ...
The paper explores the effects of alternative tax rules regarding monetary sanctions and litigation ...
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for d...
Legislation enabling courts to confiscate or remove illegal gain has grown rapidly across a wide ran...
Legislation enabling courts to confiscate or remove illegal gain has grown rapidly across a wide ran...
In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and economet...
In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and economet...
Using a laboratory experiment we explore competing claims on the welfare effects of civil forfeiture...
The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence incr...
The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence alwa...
We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
This paper examines factors affecting the decision of whether or not to make certain harmful acts il...
This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's...
We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, w...
Punishment for drug crimes includes not only penal sanctions, but economic sanctions in the form of ...
The paper explores the effects of alternative tax rules regarding monetary sanctions and litigation ...
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for d...
Legislation enabling courts to confiscate or remove illegal gain has grown rapidly across a wide ran...
Legislation enabling courts to confiscate or remove illegal gain has grown rapidly across a wide ran...
In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and economet...
In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and economet...
Using a laboratory experiment we explore competing claims on the welfare effects of civil forfeiture...
The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence incr...
The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence alwa...
We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
This paper examines factors affecting the decision of whether or not to make certain harmful acts il...
This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's...
We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, w...
Punishment for drug crimes includes not only penal sanctions, but economic sanctions in the form of ...
The paper explores the effects of alternative tax rules regarding monetary sanctions and litigation ...
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for d...