The payment cards market is a two-sided market. Cost sensitivity of both consumers and merchants for card services influences total demand. Survey data of Dutch merchants shows that costs and cost perception affect acceptance as well as surcharging decisions. Merchants who find payment cards expensive are less likely to accept them and more likely to surcharge their customers for using them. Merchants who face any competition accept debit card payments relatively more often than merchants with monopoly power, and they are less likely to surcharge their customers for debit card usage. Intense competition leads to higher credit card acceptance.
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of creating a Single Euro Payments Area. We study the e...
We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer’s payment instrument choice. C...
Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and there...
In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for car...
In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for car...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
The role of payment cards in modern economies can hardly be underrated. In 2013, debit and credit ca...
We consider debit and credit card networks. Our contribution is to introduce the role of consumer cr...
The role of payment cards in modern economies can hardly be underrated. In 2013, debit and credit ca...
International audienceIn recent years, regulators in various parts of the world have capped intercha...
This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card co...
Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees ...
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of creating a Single Euro Payments Area. We study the e...
We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer’s payment instrument choice. C...
Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and there...
In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for car...
In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for car...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
International audienceThe two-sided market theory holds that consumer adoption and merchant acceptan...
The role of payment cards in modern economies can hardly be underrated. In 2013, debit and credit ca...
We consider debit and credit card networks. Our contribution is to introduce the role of consumer cr...
The role of payment cards in modern economies can hardly be underrated. In 2013, debit and credit ca...
International audienceIn recent years, regulators in various parts of the world have capped intercha...
This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card co...
Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees ...
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of creating a Single Euro Payments Area. We study the e...
We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer’s payment instrument choice. C...
Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and there...