Add to ORKGA game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.
This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregativ...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
In this paper the authors propose a class of games, the `strategically zero-sum games', which are ch...
A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy a...
We study aggregative games in which players ’ strategy sets are convex intervals of the real line an...
The main objective of this work is to describe games which fall under title of Potential and simplif...
Abstract. An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is a f...
Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo ¤ function depends on an additively separable funct...
Various Nash equilibrium results for a broad class of aggregative games are presented. The main ones...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or ...
An abstract notion of aggregative games is introduced and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium shown to ...
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions where best reply functions are orthogonal and t...
This article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular ga...
We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games and use inclusive best reply functions to deliver oli...
In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an agg...
This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregativ...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
In this paper the authors propose a class of games, the `strategically zero-sum games', which are ch...
A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy a...
We study aggregative games in which players ’ strategy sets are convex intervals of the real line an...
The main objective of this work is to describe games which fall under title of Potential and simplif...
Abstract. An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is a f...
Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo ¤ function depends on an additively separable funct...
Various Nash equilibrium results for a broad class of aggregative games are presented. The main ones...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or ...
An abstract notion of aggregative games is introduced and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium shown to ...
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions where best reply functions are orthogonal and t...
This article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular ga...
We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games and use inclusive best reply functions to deliver oli...
In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an agg...
This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregativ...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
In this paper the authors propose a class of games, the `strategically zero-sum games', which are ch...