Add to ORKGEconomic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.� In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.� Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.� We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used.� This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.Reputation, monitoring, expectations formation
Trust and reputation have become important topics in various domains, such as online markets, supply...
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring...
Abstract. Reputation is a fundamental instrument of partner selection. Developed within the domain o...
Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. I...
Summary. Trust and reputation systems have proven to be essential to enforc-ing cooperative behavior...
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is...
We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run oppon...
This article, which explores how economists model a firm's reputation, elaborates the standard econo...
Modern communication habits are largely shaped by the extensive use of social media and other online...
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives is positivel...
This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public moni...
This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two dif...
We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players i...
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolu-tion. We define a player’s gro...
Abstract: In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In “Bad Repu...
Trust and reputation have become important topics in various domains, such as online markets, supply...
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring...
Abstract. Reputation is a fundamental instrument of partner selection. Developed within the domain o...
Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. I...
Summary. Trust and reputation systems have proven to be essential to enforc-ing cooperative behavior...
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is...
We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run oppon...
This article, which explores how economists model a firm's reputation, elaborates the standard econo...
Modern communication habits are largely shaped by the extensive use of social media and other online...
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives is positivel...
This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public moni...
This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two dif...
We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players i...
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolu-tion. We define a player’s gro...
Abstract: In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In “Bad Repu...
Trust and reputation have become important topics in various domains, such as online markets, supply...
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring...
Abstract. Reputation is a fundamental instrument of partner selection. Developed within the domain o...