Add to ORKGIn this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is finite. Furthermore, we offer an example (due to Govindan and McLennan) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework.
We characterize ecient equilibria of common interest voting games with privately informed voters and...
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) o...
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper is about voluntary provision of public goods, ...
In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equi...
In this paper we prove that for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set o...
In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
Abstract. We study a game-theoretic model for Plurality, one of the most well-studied and widely-use...
We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Unde...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) o...
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every ...
In this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Spe...
A two-person game form is given by nonempty finite sets S1, S2 of pure strategies, a nonempty set [O...
We characterize ecient equilibria of common interest voting games with privately informed voters and...
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) o...
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper is about voluntary provision of public goods, ...
In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equi...
In this paper we prove that for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set o...
In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
Abstract. We study a game-theoretic model for Plurality, one of the most well-studied and widely-use...
We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Unde...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) o...
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every ...
In this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Spe...
A two-person game form is given by nonempty finite sets S1, S2 of pure strategies, a nonempty set [O...
We characterize ecient equilibria of common interest voting games with privately informed voters and...
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) o...
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper is about voluntary provision of public goods, ...