Add to ORKGAbstract. We consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in cases where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We are interested in maximization of the ratio, R, of happy bidders over all agents, in a feasible allocation-pricing scheme. We show NP-hardness of the optimization problem, establish lower and upper bounds of R, as well as develop greedy algorithms to approximate the optimal value of R.
Abstract. We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combina-torial public project problem and ...
We study different aspects of the multiagent resource allocation problem when the objective is to fi...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
AbstractWe consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in case...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while ...
This paper presents an auction procedure which is of particular interest when short execution times ...
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. E...
This paper presents a combinatorial auction, which is of particular interest when short completion t...
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one i...
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to ...
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (p...
We consider the problems of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. ...
Recently Cherchye et al. (2011) reformulated the Walrasian equilibrium in-equalities, introduced by ...
Abstract. We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combina-torial public project problem and ...
We study different aspects of the multiagent resource allocation problem when the objective is to fi...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
AbstractWe consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in case...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while ...
This paper presents an auction procedure which is of particular interest when short execution times ...
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. E...
This paper presents a combinatorial auction, which is of particular interest when short completion t...
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one i...
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to ...
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (p...
We consider the problems of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. ...
Recently Cherchye et al. (2011) reformulated the Walrasian equilibrium in-equalities, introduced by ...
Abstract. We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combina-torial public project problem and ...
We study different aspects of the multiagent resource allocation problem when the objective is to fi...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...