We describe mechanisms for auctions that are simultaneously truthful (alternately known as strategy-proof or incentive -compatible) and guarantee high "net" profit. We make use of appropriate variants of competitive analysis of algorithms in designing and analyzing our mechanisms. Thus, we do not require any probabilistic assumptions on bids
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in a...
<p>We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints...
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with gener...
this paper we study auctions, which are an important class of mechanisms. We consider auctions for a...
Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bi...
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solutio...
Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require t...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a dig...
AbstractThis paper studies auctions in a setting where the different bidders arrive at different tim...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2019The data used as input for many algorithms today comes...
Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as e...
This paper analyzes incentive compatible (truthful) mechanisms over restricted domains of preferenc...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for items in unlimited supply, such as digital...
Abstract: When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer...
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in a...
<p>We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints...
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with gener...
this paper we study auctions, which are an important class of mechanisms. We consider auctions for a...
Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bi...
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solutio...
Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require t...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a dig...
AbstractThis paper studies auctions in a setting where the different bidders arrive at different tim...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2019The data used as input for many algorithms today comes...
Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as e...
This paper analyzes incentive compatible (truthful) mechanisms over restricted domains of preferenc...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for items in unlimited supply, such as digital...
Abstract: When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer...
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in a...
<p>We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints...
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with gener...
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