FIPA communicative acts in defeasible logic

In agent communication languages, the inferences that can be made on the basis of a communicative action are inherently conditional, and non-monotonic. For example, a proposal only leads to a commitment, on the condition that it is accepted. And in a persuasion dialogue, assertions may later be retracted. In this paper we therefore present a defeasible logic that can be used to express a semantics for agent communication languages, and to efficiently make inferences on the basis of communicative actions. The logic is non-monotonic, allows nested rules and mental attitudes as the content of communicative actions, and has an explicit way of expressing persistence over time. Moreover, it expresses that mental attitudes are publicly attributed to agents playing roles in the dialogue. To illustrate the usefulness of the logic, we reformalize the meta-theory underlying the FIPA semantics for agent communication, focusing on inform and propose. We show how composed speech acts can be formalized, and extend the semantics with an account of persuasion.