Abstract. We analyze a mechanism that provides strong incentives for the submission of truthful feedback in virtual communities where services are exchanged on a peer-to-peer basis. Lying peers are punished with a severity that is exponential to their frequency of lying. We had first introduced and evaluated experimentally the mechanism in [1]. In this paper, we develop a Markov-chain model of the mechanism. Based on this, we prove that, when the mechanism is employed, the system evolves to a beneficial steady-state operation even in the case of a dynamically renewed population. Furthermore, we develop a procedure for the efficient selection of the parameters of the mechanism for any peerto-peer system; this procedure is based on ergodic ar...
Abstract We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a peer-to-pee...
Abstract We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a pe...
We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a peer-to-pee...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for build-ing trust...
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust ...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, provide opportuniti...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, provide opportuniti...
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to func-tion effectively. Self interested agents r...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, pro-vide opportunit...
Abstract We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a peer-to-pee...
Abstract We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a pe...
We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a peer-to-pee...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Abstract—The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that truthful feedbac...
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for build-ing trust...
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust ...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, provide opportuniti...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, provide opportuniti...
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to func-tion effectively. Self interested agents r...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, pro-vide opportunit...
Abstract We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer se...
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