Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games ∗

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited com-munication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the coopera-tion restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions which distribute dividends such that the dividend shares of players in a coalition are based on power measures for nodes in corre-sponding communication graphs. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on the class of cycle-free graph games and on the class of all graph games. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi degree solution which equals the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games and equals the position value on the class of cycle-free graph games. The Myerson value is the Harsanyi power solution that is based on the equal power measure. Finally, various applications are discussed