A Suite of Enhanced Security Models for Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience and ID-based Key Exchange

Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CK-model) for authentication and key exchange protocols in 2001 based on a modeling approach proposed by Bellare et al. in 1998. The model not only reasonably captures the power of practical attackers but also provides a modular approach to the design of secure key exchange protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience, which has been studied elaborately with respect to key exchange protocols. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been performed heuristically and it has been di#cult to apply existing security models and formal analysis methods to the study of KCI attacks. In this paper, we solve this problem by proposing an enhancement of the CK-model for capturing KCI attacks