Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks (The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants)

Denial of Service attacks are presenting an increasing threat to the global inter-networking infrastructure. While TCP's congestion control algorithm is highly robust to diverse network conditions, its implicit assumption of end-system cooperation results in a wellknown vulnerability to attack by high-rate non-responsive flows. In this paper, we investigate a class of low-rate denial of service attacks which, unlike high-rate attacks, are difficult for routers and counter-DoS mechanisms to detect. Using a combination of analytical modeling, simulations, and Internet experiments, we show that maliciously chosen low-rate DoS traffic patterns that exploit TCP's retransmission time-out mechanism can throttle TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate while eluding detection. Moreover, as such attacks exploit protocol homogeneity, we study fundamental limits of the ability of a class of randomized time-out mechanisms to thwart such low-rate DoS attacks