Virtual Path Bandwidth Allocation in Multi-User Networks

We consider a multi-user network that is shared by noncooperative users. Each user sets up virtual paths that optimize its own, selfish, performance measure. This measure accounts for both the guaranteed call level quality of service, as well as for the cost incurred for reserving the resource. The interaction between the user strategies is formalized as a game. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, and that it possesses a certain fairness property. We investigate the dynamics of this game, and prove convergence to the Nash equilibrium of both a Gauss-Seidel scheme and a Jacobi scheme. We extend our study to various general network topologies. 1 Introduction A trade-off encountered in communication networks is between bandwidth utilization and the complexity of call set-up. Consider for example, virtual circuit networks, in which resources are reserved upon call set up and released immediately upon call completion. This results in an optimal resource utilization but a..