An intelligent agent uses known facts, including statistical knowledge, to assign degrees of belief to assertions it is uncertain about. We investigate three principled techniques for doing this. All three are applications of the principle of indifference, because they assign equal degree of belief to all basic "situations" consistent with the knowledge base. They differ because there are competing intuitions about what the basic situations are. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as the preference for the most specific statistical data available, turn out to follow from some or all of the techniques. This is an improvement over earlier theories, such as work on direct inference and reference classes, which arbitrarily pos...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
AbstractAn intelligent agent will often be uncertain about various properties of its environment, an...
We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible...
AbstractAn intelligent agent will often be uncertain about various properties of its environment, an...
The dissertation investigates the nature of partial beliefs and norms governing their use. One widel...
The dissertation investigates the nature of partial beliefs and norms governing their use. One widel...
Degrees of belief are formed using observed evidence and statistical background information. In thi...
Degrees of belief are formed using observed evidence and statistical background information. In this...
In previous work [BGHK92, BGHK93], we have studied the random-worlds approach—a particular (and quit...
Bayesian principles of indifference imply strict commitment to states of neutrality among alternate ...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
AbstractAn intelligent agent will often be uncertain about various properties of its environment, an...
We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible...
AbstractAn intelligent agent will often be uncertain about various properties of its environment, an...
The dissertation investigates the nature of partial beliefs and norms governing their use. One widel...
The dissertation investigates the nature of partial beliefs and norms governing their use. One widel...
Degrees of belief are formed using observed evidence and statistical background information. In thi...
Degrees of belief are formed using observed evidence and statistical background information. In this...
In previous work [BGHK92, BGHK93], we have studied the random-worlds approach—a particular (and quit...
Bayesian principles of indifference imply strict commitment to states of neutrality among alternate ...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...
Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functio...