CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY—A ROUGH GEOGRAPHY

Much recent work on concepts has been inspired by and is developed within the bounds of the representational theory of the mind often taken for granted by philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, and psychologists alike (see e.g. Margolis and Laurence 1999; Stich and Warfield 1994). The contributions to this volume take a more encompassing perspective on the issue of concepts. Rather than modelling details of our representational architecture in line with the dominant paradigm, they explore three traditional issues concerning concepts. Inquiring into how language and the mind are interrelated, Brandom, Bermúdez, Nida-Rümelin and Racokzy ask: Is mastery of a language necessary for thought? Pondering whether drawing on concepts to explain our thinking requires us to adopt the representational paradigm of the mind in the first place, Kenny, Glock, and Saporiti are concerned with the question: Do concepts reduce to abilities? Finally, in order to assess the prospects for philosophical reliance on conceptua