Abstract. We study ballot independence for election schemes: – We formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. – We introduce a notion of controlled malleability and show that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also show that non-malleable ballots are sufficient, but not necessary, for ballot independence. – We prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy under practical assumptions. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.
We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a pro-tocol with ballots and a ballot box. ...
In secret ballot protocols, the umque voting property is crucial since without it a voter may vote m...
Remark. Appears in ACNS 2004, this is the full paper. It contains a proof of Theorem 1, some more de...
International audienceWe study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define b...
We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as ...
We study ballot secrecy and ballot independence for election schemes. First, we propose a definition...
We propose a definition of ballot secrecy as an indistinguishability game in the computational model...
Abstract. We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In...
We exhibit the precise security guarantees that a public key encryption scheme needs to satisfy to g...
We show that any function F can be securely evaluated by a protocolwith ballots and a ballot box. Th...
We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In addition ...
Abstract—We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In ...
International audienceRecently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which...
International audienceHelios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting...
We propose a new encryption primitive, commitment consistent encryption (CCE), and instances of this...
We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a pro-tocol with ballots and a ballot box. ...
In secret ballot protocols, the umque voting property is crucial since without it a voter may vote m...
Remark. Appears in ACNS 2004, this is the full paper. It contains a proof of Theorem 1, some more de...
International audienceWe study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define b...
We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as ...
We study ballot secrecy and ballot independence for election schemes. First, we propose a definition...
We propose a definition of ballot secrecy as an indistinguishability game in the computational model...
Abstract. We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In...
We exhibit the precise security guarantees that a public key encryption scheme needs to satisfy to g...
We show that any function F can be securely evaluated by a protocolwith ballots and a ballot box. Th...
We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In addition ...
Abstract—We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In ...
International audienceRecently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which...
International audienceHelios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting...
We propose a new encryption primitive, commitment consistent encryption (CCE), and instances of this...
We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a pro-tocol with ballots and a ballot box. ...
In secret ballot protocols, the umque voting property is crucial since without it a voter may vote m...
Remark. Appears in ACNS 2004, this is the full paper. It contains a proof of Theorem 1, some more de...