Abstract In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structure, called graph games. Agents are able to cooperate only if they can communicate directly or indirectly with each other. For the class of acyclic graph games the average tree solution has recently been proposed. It was proven that the average tree solution is a core element if the game exhibits super-additivity. We show that the condition of super-additivity can be relaxed to a weaker condition, which admits for a natural interpretation. Moreover, we introduce the concept of subcore, which is a subset of the core, always contains the average tree solution, and therefore is a non-empty refinement of the core
Abstract: We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, ...
We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the cl...
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focu...
In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structur...
In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structur...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players...
This paper considers cooperative transferable utility games with graph structure,called graph games....
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
We consider transferable utility cooperative games (TU games) with limited cooperation introduced by...
In this paper we consider cooperative graph games being TU-games in which players cooperate if they ...
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic c...
In this article, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a...
Abstract: We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, ...
We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the cl...
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focu...
In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structur...
In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structur...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players...
This paper considers cooperative transferable utility games with graph structure,called graph games....
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
We consider transferable utility cooperative games (TU games) with limited cooperation introduced by...
In this paper we consider cooperative graph games being TU-games in which players cooperate if they ...
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic c...
In this article, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a...
Abstract: We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, ...
We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the cl...
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focu...