Secure nearest neighbor revisited

Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secure nearest neighbor (SNN) problem, in which a client issues an encrypted query point E(q) to a cloud service provider and asks for an encrypted data point in E(D) (the encrypted database) that is closest to the query point, without allowing the server to learn the plaintexts of the data or the query (and its result). We show that efficient attacks exist for existing SNN methods [15], [21], even though they were claimed to be secure in standard security models (such as indistinguishability under chosen plaintext or ciphertext attacks). We also establish a relationship between the SNN problem and the order-preserving encryption (OPE) problem from the cryptography field [5], [6], and we show that SNN is at least as hard as OPE. Since it is impossible to construct secure OPE schemes in standard security models [5], [6], our results imply that one cannot expect to find the exact (encrypted) nearest neighbor based on only E(q) and E(D). Given this hardness result, we design new SNN methods by asking the server, given only E(q) and E(D), to return a relevant (encrypted) partition E(G) from E(D) (i.e., G ⊆ D), such that thatE(G) is guaranteed to contain the answer for the SNN query. Our methods provide customizable tradeoff between efficiency and communication cost, and they are as secure as the encryption scheme E used to encrypt the query and the database, where E can be any well-established encryption schemes. I