Practically all industrialized economies restrict the length of time that credit bureaus can retain borrowers ’ negative credit information. There is, however, a large variation in the permitted retention times across countries. By exploiting a quasi-experimental variation in this retention time, we investigate what happens when negative information is deleted earlier from credit files. We find that the loss of information led banks to tighten their lending standards significantly as the expected retention time was diminished from on average three-and-a-half to three years exactly. Simultaneously, we find that borrowers who experience this shorter retention time default more frequently. Since borrowers nevertheless obtain more net access to...
International audienceBank discouragement is one of the most important factors preventing firms from...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
Abstract: We develop a model that derives “screening ” and “incentive ” effects of credit informatio...
In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defau...
Swedish law mandates the removal of negative credit arrears from credit reports after 3 years. We us...
Federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years. The re...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenou...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defau...
This paper analyses debt decision making of individuals, being aware that any debt decision is an in...
Information sharing about borrowers ’ characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effe...
Banks' limited knowledge about borrowers' creditworthiness constitutes an important friction in cred...
We exploit exogenous variation in firm's public information available to banks to empirically evalua...
The initial focus of the paper is placed on studying the demand-side of the consumer credit market. ...
International audienceBank discouragement is one of the most important factors preventing firms from...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
Abstract: We develop a model that derives “screening ” and “incentive ” effects of credit informatio...
In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defau...
Swedish law mandates the removal of negative credit arrears from credit reports after 3 years. We us...
Federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years. The re...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenou...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defau...
This paper analyses debt decision making of individuals, being aware that any debt decision is an in...
Information sharing about borrowers ’ characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effe...
Banks' limited knowledge about borrowers' creditworthiness constitutes an important friction in cred...
We exploit exogenous variation in firm's public information available to banks to empirically evalua...
The initial focus of the paper is placed on studying the demand-side of the consumer credit market. ...
International audienceBank discouragement is one of the most important factors preventing firms from...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
Abstract: We develop a model that derives “screening ” and “incentive ” effects of credit informatio...