www.cdfai.org

After nearly a decade of military commitment to war, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Canadian government in 2010 initiated a shift in its national security and economic policies that would ultimately lead to a significant contraction in the total level of funding invested in national defence. One of the first steps taken was the issuance of a directive to the Department of National Defence (DND) to undertake an internal audit of its recent organizational behaviour. Specifically, the Canadian Forces Transformation Team (CFTT), then under the direction of Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, was ordered to identify areas where DND “could reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness, [in order] to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite constrained resources”. 1 For General Leslie and his team, however, finding a perfect solution to this problem was impossible. Already battered by the realities of global recession, changing policies, government deficit fighting measures, and an impending departmental strategic review, there was no doubt that difficult choices would have to be made. Therefore, the recommendations put forth in General Leslie’s Report on Transformation surely appeared draconian, and not unexpectedly invited immediate criticism from both the affected stakeholders as well as th