THE DILEMMA OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE

Management of many global marine fisheries have faltered under science-based government-sponsored management regimes. While the result has often been biological stock failures and consequent socio-economic problems, there are instances where enhanced conservation efforts have led to fishery management success. Studies of New England fisheries reveal that the relative success of fishery management can be explained in terms of the interaction between the fishing industry and the government, the relative power of each in the fishery management exchange, the degree to which information and perceptions about the fishery are comparable, the scale and complexity of the fishery to be managed, and the ability of the parties bargaining for fisheries management to reduce transaction costs that impede efforts to develop control rules. In large scale highly complex fisheries where asymmetries in power and information exist, the fishery management bargaining process will be marked by high transaction costs that will not be easily overcome, leading to institutional failure. Whereinfonnation and perception about the resource is asymmetrical, but where power symmetries exist, it is possible to negotiate effective resource conservation rules