This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf of their investors and when they should not. It argues that voting authority for mutual funds ought to depend upon: (1) whether the fund possesses a comparative information advantage, and (2) the ability of the fund to assume a common investor purpose. The strongest case for mutual fund voting is one in which high-quality information is produced and the fund is able to assume a common investor purpose. The case for mutual fund voting is weaker when low quality information is produced or where funds cannot assume a common investor purpose. Applying this theory answers whether and how mutual funds should vote on recurring issues. Mutual funds ...
Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta and Konstantinos E. Zachariadis discuss how this presents a confli...
Corporate law is attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, but such transactions har...
Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators al...
This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf...
Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual fu...
When Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was skeptical of ...
Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of...
This chapter investigates voting decisions by mutual funds in a variety of management-sponsored prop...
Investment advisers to mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and separately managed accounts are typi...
We employ a new comprehensive proxy voting records database to investigate whether mutual funds cons...
This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation...
The Supreme Court\u27s recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potent...
This thesis is composed of two essays that study the effectiveness of shareholder democracy. In the...
This article analyzes mutual fund voting data from 2003-2008, the first five proxy seasons for which...
The concentration of public equity in the hands of just a few mutual-fund complexes has raised conce...
Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta and Konstantinos E. Zachariadis discuss how this presents a confli...
Corporate law is attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, but such transactions har...
Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators al...
This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf...
Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual fu...
When Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was skeptical of ...
Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of...
This chapter investigates voting decisions by mutual funds in a variety of management-sponsored prop...
Investment advisers to mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and separately managed accounts are typi...
We employ a new comprehensive proxy voting records database to investigate whether mutual funds cons...
This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation...
The Supreme Court\u27s recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potent...
This thesis is composed of two essays that study the effectiveness of shareholder democracy. In the...
This article analyzes mutual fund voting data from 2003-2008, the first five proxy seasons for which...
The concentration of public equity in the hands of just a few mutual-fund complexes has raised conce...
Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta and Konstantinos E. Zachariadis discuss how this presents a confli...
Corporate law is attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, but such transactions har...
Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators al...