Plantinga\u27s proper functionalism, knowledge, and rationality

Epistemic warrant is that property which converts true belief to knowledge. A theory of epistemic warrant known as proper functionalism has been developed recently by Alvin Plantinga. In this study I explore and evaluate Plantinga\u27s new theory of epistemic warrant. In chapter one, I lay out in some detail Plantinga\u27s proposed account of epistemic warrant. Chapters two through four are devoted to a careful consideration of critiques of proper functionalism by three of Plantinga\u27s leading critics and Plantinga\u27s responses to those criticisms. In chapters five and six, I develop my own criticisms of Plantinga\u27s account, and contend that the conditions which Plantinga proposes in his account of warrant are neither jointly sufficient nor individually necessary for warrant.While proper functionalism is not satisfactory as a theory of epistemic warrant, it can be modified slightly and converted into an illuminating theory of rationality with respect to belief. In chapter seven I sketch a proper functionalist explication of an objective conception of rationality. Then in chapter eight I consider another conception of rationality, a subjective conception, which is parasitic upon that considered in chapter seven, and which thus significantly involves proper functionalist considerations