Add to ORKGThe late Colonel John Boyd, who knew a thing or two about strategic thought, was fond of declaring that excellence in warfare and other human endeavors depended on people, ideas, and hardware—in that order.1 We postulate that Japan has lost sight of this commonsense axiom, allowing strategic thought to atrophy
I would submit to you that Admiral Mahan himself was only secondarily a propagandist for his views ...
China’s aggressive land-reclamation projects in Asian waters represent a challenge to the status quo...
The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of confli...
In 1971 James Auer published The Post- war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–1971, “a boo...
The major arguments of Mahan are very different than has been supposed. Yet the issues that prompted...
Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of China commonly compare this emerging Asian titan to imper...
Of all the principles of Japan\u27s national defense policy, perhaps the most significant principles...
As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critic...
East Asia is the one part of the world where great-power war remains thinkable. That is because it i...
The lead article in this issue of the Review continues our exploration of contemporary developments ...
Japan is at an inflection point. Depending on how particular peoples and nations view this enigmatic...
Book review of Sadao Asada. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United St...
Chinese reactions to the U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy provide a window into a larger strategic ...
Geography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Brit- ain and later the Unite...
A strategy, argues a distinguished Naval War College scholar, will show the maritime services what t...
I would submit to you that Admiral Mahan himself was only secondarily a propagandist for his views ...
China’s aggressive land-reclamation projects in Asian waters represent a challenge to the status quo...
The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of confli...
In 1971 James Auer published The Post- war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–1971, “a boo...
The major arguments of Mahan are very different than has been supposed. Yet the issues that prompted...
Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of China commonly compare this emerging Asian titan to imper...
Of all the principles of Japan\u27s national defense policy, perhaps the most significant principles...
As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critic...
East Asia is the one part of the world where great-power war remains thinkable. That is because it i...
The lead article in this issue of the Review continues our exploration of contemporary developments ...
Japan is at an inflection point. Depending on how particular peoples and nations view this enigmatic...
Book review of Sadao Asada. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United St...
Chinese reactions to the U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy provide a window into a larger strategic ...
Geography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Brit- ain and later the Unite...
A strategy, argues a distinguished Naval War College scholar, will show the maritime services what t...
I would submit to you that Admiral Mahan himself was only secondarily a propagandist for his views ...
China’s aggressive land-reclamation projects in Asian waters represent a challenge to the status quo...
The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of confli...