The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria for the ubiquitous class of discounted infinite horizon differential games are investigated. It is shown that the functional forms and values of the parameters specified in a differential game are crucial in determining the local stability of a steady state and, in turn, the steady state comparative statics and local comparative dynamics. A simple sufficient condition for a steady state to be a local saddle point is provided. The power and reach of the results are demonstrated by applying them to two well-known differential games
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...
Abstract: In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for ...
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...
The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric o...
The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiq...
The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiq...
The primal-dual comparative statics method of Samuelson (1965) and Silberberg (1974) is extended to ...
We propose a finite time differential game as a model for some economic processes and derive conditi...
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the topic of differential games and resource economi...
The envelope theorem is extended to cover the class of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon di...
Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The t...
Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The t...
The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are der...
Contains fulltext : 141595.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)In this paper...
It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with thos...
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...
Abstract: In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for ...
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...
The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric o...
The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiq...
The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiq...
The primal-dual comparative statics method of Samuelson (1965) and Silberberg (1974) is extended to ...
We propose a finite time differential game as a model for some economic processes and derive conditi...
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the topic of differential games and resource economi...
The envelope theorem is extended to cover the class of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon di...
Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The t...
Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The t...
The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are der...
Contains fulltext : 141595.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)In this paper...
It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with thos...
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...
Abstract: In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for ...
Envelope theorems are established for locally differentiable Stackelberg equilibria of a general cla...